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ABSTRACT Malta, a very small state, a micro–state, has never resigned itself to small-
ness. The nature of such states’ vulnerability is seen as both inherent and contingent.
Micro states can by following prudent domestic policies and by strategically positioning
themselves in the regional and global system, strengthen their resilience to both these
types of vulnerability. This article outlines how the EU may ‘enlarge’ such states in both
economic and security–political terms. It offers such states increased opportunities for
dealing with the social, economic, environmental and security challenges which they
face thus helping them to reduce their vulnerabilities while increasing their resilience to
exogenous and endogenous shocks.
KEY WORDS: States’ size, European Union, micro–states, small states, Malta, 
vulnerability, resilience
Introduction
This article focuses on how European small states and, more especially,
micro–states, can address the vulnerabilities that arise from their size. Malta
— the smallest state in the EU–25, with a population of 0.38 million —
provides the main empirical base of the article.
The principal way in which small European states can compensate for their
size is by following sound policies and by strategically positioning themselves
in the European and, more broadly, the global system. EU membership offers
a particularly attractive range of possibilities: more secure access to markets,
reliable sources of supply, participation in decision–making institutions, a
more effective role in the management of external affairs, and enhancement
of opportunities to deal with fundamental social, economic, environmental
and security challenges.
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The approach taken in this article involves using the framework of analysis
developed in analysing the behaviour of small states in international affairs
and applying it to small states in the European Union. However, the analysis
recognises that, in the EU, state and non–state and supranational and sub–
national actors interact in such a unique manner as to make a purely
international relations approach insufficient to capture the essential dynam-
ics of small or micro states in the Union.
‘Vulnerability’ and ‘Resilience’
The past decade has witnessed a renewed interest and an expanding volume
of literature on small states in world affairs and on small states in the EU.
The literature on small states and the EU divides into two main bodies. One
focuses on the behaviour of small states in the Union’s institutions, their
power and influence, and the impact of the growth in the number of small
member states on the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU’s decision–
making institutions (see, for example: Archer & Nugent 2002; Magnette &
Nicolaïdis 2003). The other body of literature takes a comparative politics
approach and analyses the process of European integration from a particular
small state’s perspective (see, for example: Pace 2001; Thorhallsson 2004;
Stefanou 2005).
Outside the EU small states literature, the Commonwealth Secretariat has
long sponsored useful work on small states, which has in turn filtered
through to the UN and its agencies (see the Commonwealth Secretariat
reports of 1985, 1990 and 1997). This work, which has been taken up by
many engaged in small states studies, evolved from an initial emphasis on
‘viability’ to one focused more on ‘vulnerability’. At the heart of the vulner-
ability approach lies a simple observation: the success of some small states —
such as Luxembourg and Singapore with their high gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita — actually masks considerable vulnerabilities arising from
their smallness.
In considering the vulnerabilities to which small states may be subject, a
distinction must be made between inherent vulnerability, which is relatively
fixed, and contingent or self–inflicted vulnerability resulting from wrong
policy choices and policy failures. Factors determining inherent vulnerabili-
ties include location, geo–strategic importance, dependence on key imports
(especially food and energy), population density, and economic specialisa-
tion and diversification. Contingent vulnerabilities normally result from bad
governance.
Although ‘vulnerability’ is thus multi–dimensional, most of the analysis of
small states’ vulnerabilities tends to be concentrated on economic and secu-
rity aspects. So, for example, since 1992, pioneering work by Lino Briguglio
on the concept of economic vulnerability has led to the construction of
‘vulnerability indices’ which demonstrate that, while all states are vulnerable
to a certain degree, small states tend to be particularly so because of their
smallness (Briguglio & Kisanga 2004). Small island states can exhibit addi-
tional vulnerabilities in comparison with small land states because of such
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factors as remoteness from economic centres and proneness to experiencing
climatic (hurricanes and typhoons) and geological (volcanic eruptions)
extremes.
As for the political and security aspects of vulnerability, UN resolutions
have long pointed out that “small states may be particularly vulnerable to
external threats and acts of interference in their internal affairs” (UN 1989).
Many of the salient works of the 1950s right up to the 1990s, no doubt influ-
enced by the Cold War research agenda and the decolonisation process,
focused almost exclusively on the security problems of small or weak states
and their relations to the super powers (e.g., Baker Fox 1959; Handel 1990;
Rothstein 1968, 1977; Vital 1967, 1971). The end of the Cold War did not
sound the death knell to this interest. Indeed, the newer security concerns of
small states feature prominently in the Commonwealth Secretariat reports.
Of course, the nature of the security threat faced by micro–states varies
according to a range of factors, with island, especially archipelagic island,
states having a particular problem because of the territorial sea that surrounds
them. For example, Malta’s territorial sea is thirteen times its land mass. Such
territorial size combined with a small population is inversely proportional to
security: micro–states in such a situation lack the resources needed to effec-
tively manage, control and exploit the resources of huge ocean territories. In
consequence, their external security dependence tends to increase.
Since the early 1990s, the focus on the vulnerabilities of small states has
been joined by increased attention to their ‘resilience’. Small states are not
helpless in the sense that they can only look to external aid to rescue them
from their disabilities. Rather, there is usually much they can also do to help
themselves: by building up their resilience to shock. Ways in which Malta has
done this will be explored later in the paper.
European and EU Micro–states
There is no single generally accepted definition in the literature of what
constitutes a small or a micro–state (see Croward 2002). For working
purposes here, EU member states with a population of around 11 million or
less will be classified as small. Within this group, the five states that have
populations between 0.4 and 2 million — namely Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus,
Luxembourg and Malta — will be classified as micro. These micro–states —
key features of which are set out in Table 1 — are very different in character
from Europe’s ‘micro–micro–states’ or ‘city–states’ (comprising San Marino,
the Vatican, Monaco, Liechtenstein and Andorra): most particularly in that
they are both larger and more independent.
The European micro–states differ among themselves in many ways, as
Table 1 helps to show. Included amongst the differences are population sizes,
territorial areas and economic indicators. A particularly important difference
not listed in Table 1 is the contrast in physical locations, Luxembourg and
Slovenia being close to the economic heartland of Europe while Estonia,
Cyprus and Malta lie at the periphery, and Cyprus and Malta being island–
states whilst the other three are land states.
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On the question of security, which is a major problem for all small states,
the European micro–states vary in key respects. When facing up to their
‘hard core’ security challenges, they have adopted different approaches,
influenced by their unique historical experiences. Luxembourg, Slovenia and
Estonia have joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO);
Cyprus and Malta have not. Malta has adopted neutrality and enshrined it
in its Constitution, while Cyprus was a co–founder of the now defunct Non–
Aligned Movement (NAM). The micro–states also confront a different set of
security challenges: Slovenia faces the instability, perhaps subsiding, of the
Balkans; Estonia looks with concern at the turbulence generated in neigh-
bouring Russia, which it views with suspicion; Cyprus and Malta are affected
by the instability generated by the Middle East conflict; and Cyprus grapples
with the problem of the forcible division of its territory caused by the Turkish
occupation. Additionally, some of the European micro–states also face ‘soft
security’ threats, such as illegal immigration, resulting from their peripheral
location and the fact that they constitute the EU’s outer frontier.
Countering Vulnerabilities and Strengthening Resilience
How can European micro–states overcome their inherent and contingent
vulnerabilities and strengthen their resilience? The European micro–states’
choice is influenced by political, economic and security considerations
(Nugent 2003). The truism is that, without access to the EU market, and in
the absence of alternative proximate markets, the micro–states of Europe
cannot survive. By integrating with the EU, small states seek to ‘enlarge
themselves’. Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore point out that, while the
Table 1. Main Characteristics of the Micro–states of Europe
Country
Population 
2004 (millions) Area km2
GDP per capita in 
PPS (EU–25 = 100) 
2000–2002 average
GDP per 
capita ranking 
EU–25
Trade with
EU–25 as 
percentage of 
total trade
(X + M)*
Slovenia 1.99 20,151 74.4 18 72
Estonia 1.4 45,226 45 22 74
Cyprus 0.72 9,259 85.8 14 57
Luxembourg 0.45 2,486 214.8 1 83
Malta 0.4 316 75.9 16 59
Total 4.96 77,438 n/a n/a n/a
EU–25 456.5 3,991,539 100 n/a n/a
Iceland 0.29 103,000 119 6 62
Source: Eurostat News Release 13/2005, 25.01.2005 for GDP per capita in PPS; for Iceland Eurostat 
News Release 145/2004, 03.12.2004; Population, Eurostat News Release 105/2004, 31.08.2004; 
Iceland share of EU trade estimate from figures published by the Central Bank of Iceland; n/a = not 
available. *X (exports) and M (imports).
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political size of a state may be small, its market size may grow larger the more
it integrates in the world economy (Alesina 2003, 82–83).
The EU offers micro–states the significant advantages of a large market
and macro–economic stability (which increases resilience to external shocks),
while at the same time serving as a gateway to the world economy. The
political costs of integrating with the EU are small for, despite the strong
perceptions to the contrary, EU membership does not put the small states’
identity at risk, since the EU is based on the same political and economic
liberal values which they espouse and is committed to safeguarding the iden-
tity of its member states (Treaty on European Union, Article 6). Furthermore,
small and weak states on their own must still adjust to globalisation, but in
regional organisations such as the EU a group of states can reach a sufficient
‘critical mass’ to be able to exercise some control with regard to global
corporations and other mobile entities (Keohane & Nye 2001, 260). Beyond
economics, other advantages of EU membership for micro–states include an
extension of their diplomatic reach and more effective participation in multi-
lateral and global affairs.
The advantages of EU membership for micro–states become clear when
compared with the position of non–EU small states like Iceland and Norway,
which criticise the EU for its lack of consultation on new European Economic
Area (EEA) legislation that they have to implement. For this reason, non–EU
small states have called for an upgrading of the EEA since it constrains their
sovereignty (Claes & Fossum 2002; Magnússon 2003 — the latter author is
Iceland’s Minister of Social Affairs). The history of the European micro–
states shows, with few exceptions, that from the early stages of the European
integration process or alternatively from the very first years of their indepen-
dence, they have generally sought to integrate closely with the EU: 
- Luxembourg is an EU founding state.
- Malta showed interest in EEC membership in 1962 when it was just
beginning to negotiate its independence from Britain.
- Cyprus’s first approach to the EEC was in 1962. Cyprus and Malta
approached the EEC separately in the late 1960s to negotiate a trade
agreement with it. An association agreement with Malta entered into
effect in 1971 and with Cyprus in 1972.
- Many of the states which became independent following the demise of
the Soviet system and Yugoslavia, including Slovenia and the Baltic
states, initially concluded ‘Europe Agreements’ with the EU and then
joined it.
- The ‘micro–micro–states’ (the Vatican, Andorra, Monaco, San Marino)
are in economic and monetary union with the EU; Iceland and
Liechtenstein form part of the EEA.
There is no doubt that the EU thus exercises a ‘gravitational’ pull on Europe’s
micro–states.
What conclusions can we draw from this? First, that EU membership helps
micro–states to strengthen their economic security by giving them a wider
and more secure market access without which economic activity would be
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impossible. Second, that the EU is also a ‘security community’ of democratic
states committed to upholding international norms which make the world
safer for small states. These characteristics of the EU were strengthened
further by the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty, particularly by way of
its solidarity clause and mutual defence provisions.
But while integration with the EU provides micro–states with more oppor-
tunities to help them overcome their vulnerabilities and strengthen their
resilience, the successful employment of these opportunities depends on the
micro–state itself. Table 2 shows how the main EU policies or ‘actions’ can
help micro–states overcome their vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities
are grouped under six main headings: economic, political, security, social
cohesion, the environment and innovation. Innovation is included on the
assumption that a state which fails to join the innovation mainstream loses
its competitiveness in the global economy and its vulnerabilities increase. The
‘inherent’ vulnerabilities of micro–states — immutable in the long term —
can be mitigated if the states strengthen their resilience by prudent policies of
‘storing’ resources to meet future contingencies. The non–inherent vulnera-
bilities depend largely on policy choices or good governance.
Employing Briguglio’s metaphorical description, a micro–state can either
be “self–made” or a “prodigal son”. The former involves consistently pursu-
ing policies that address inherent and non–inherent vulnerabilities and thus
increase resilience to shocks. The latter involves assuming an attitude
whereby the need to strengthen resilience is neglected — which contributes
to augmenting vulnerabilities. It is argued here that, by integrating closer
with the EU, European micro–states are practising prudent resilience–build-
ing policies with a relatively lesser risk of losing political identity. The level
of integration that small and micro–states have chosen has varied, with some
opting for membership (the Baltic States, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Cyprus and
Malta) and others (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) preferring a very close
relationship falling just short of membership. Of this latter group, Iceland,
for example, has wanted wider market access for its output while continuing
to safeguard its important fisheries industry through the EEA route.
Working Inside the EU
It is often argued that the position of micro–states in the EU is weak
(Moravcsik 1999). The micro–states’ own self–perception is also usually one
of weakness but this does not mean that they are necessarily ‘resigned to their
fate’. The discussion in this section shows how micro–states can fend for
themselves in the EU institutions and can use their EU membership to reduce
their vulnerabilities and strengthen their resilience.
EU–Malta Negotiations
The EU–Malta membership negotiations demonstrate some salient points on
how micro–states can possibly overcome power asymmetries in negotia-
tions, both before and after becoming EU members. They are useful for
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demonstrating post–membership possibilities because within EU institutions
micro–states are often involved in similar negotiations to achieve national
goals. It is further argued that it is only if they can navigate sufficiently freely
within the institutions that EU membership enables them to reduce their
vulnerabilities and augment their resilience.
Within a norm–based EU, the influence which a micro–state exercises
depends on its ability to present a strong case in favour of its demands that
respect these norms. It must also show that the costs of the concessions
requested are negligible and unimportant for the Union — though they are
salient for the micro–state. Thus the handicap of small size can be and must
be transformed into a negotiating advantage. The EU–Malta negotiations
show that ‘presenting a strong case’ in favour of concessions requires a deep
knowledge of EU policies, the acquis and its underlying principles, in addi-
tion to an equally strong knowledge of the national sector on which the
country is negotiating. This can be achieved by building national information
sources and by maintaining a strong link with the sector’s national represen-
tatives (trade unions, producers’ associations and non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs)) which, in a small state, is easier to achieve because of the
lighter, and less layered, political and administrative systems.
During the accession negotiations the Maltese government maintained
close and regular exchanges of views with sectoral representatives on crucial
issues. The government also maintained a strong link with the public at large
since the final membership accord had to be approved by the people in a
referendum. Hence, the Malta–EU Information Centre (MIC) was set up to
disseminate information to the public. Sectoral and public feedback was
received through the discussions in the Malta–EU Action and Steering
Committee (MEUSAC) chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which
practically all NGOs and sectoral representatives participated. MEUSAC
had the task of preparing Malta’s position papers for the negotiations.
To tackle Malta’s lack of information during negotiations, the European
Commission’s own information sources and expertise were also useful, as
was an ‘informal alliance’ with two large member states — the UK and, to a
lesser extent, Italy. The political ‘costs’ associated with such alliances are that
the member state offering such help may require the micro–state’s support in
the institutions at a later stage. However, it may also give rise to a more
enduring relationship characterised by additional collaborative opportuni-
ties of mutual benefit.
States are sensitive of their identity, but this sensitivity becomes more acute
the smaller the state is, particularly if it has a colonial past and a history of
foreign domination. In Malta’s case, the most import identity–related pre–
membership ‘red lines’ concerned the acceptance of the Maltese language —
which is a unique Semetic language descended from Medieval Arabic — as
an official EU language and the recognition of the island’s predominantly
Catholic identity. The latter resulted in a protocol attached to the Act of
Accession maintaining Malta’s absolute sovereignty on abortion.
Comparing the number of transitional arrangements and derogations
secured by the ten new member states in the negotiations, Malta secured the
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largest number (72), the longest transitional arrangements, and some highly
important permanent derogations — notably on the acquisition of secondary
residencies by EU nationals, restrictions on the free movement of persons and
the management of a fishing conservation zone. Key points ‘conceded’ to
Malta in the negotiations are outlined in Appendix 1. The justification for
many of the concessions that were made — such as the restrictions on the
purchase of property and on the free movement of persons, and the special
treatment given to the island of Gozo — was Malta’s small size. Some
concessions, however, were linked to, or, in a few cases, were largely a result
of, other factors. For example: environmental, conservation and economic
arguments all fed into the fishing zone agreement; the declaration on Malta’s
neutrality was linked to the manner in which Malta sees itself in world affairs
and the need to maintain the national consensus on this issue; the transitional
arrangements on the dock yards was driven by a mixture of economic goals
and a need to mitigate the negative social implications of unemployment.
As a result of the concessions secured by Malta in the negotiations, the
opportunities for Malta — both economic and non–economic — increase,
which help it to cope much better with resilience–building.
The Advantages and Constraints of Participating in the EU Institutions
The costs and benefits of EU membership for a micro–state can best be
compared by reference to the next best alternative. In Malta’s case this
is a free trade agreement with the EU within the Euro–Mediterranean
Partnership. By participating in the EU institutions Malta can influence the
policies and decisions which affect it and thus strengthen its resilience. It can
put across its views directly during EU processes, it has direct access to EU
services and it operates in a richer information environment. In addition, it
gains some influence in the EU’s external policies, particularly in the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that are crucial for its security
and economic stability. Since decisions in the CFSP are based on unanimity,
the micro–state’s influence is stronger. Thus, for example, by joining the EU,
Malta enjoys more influence in the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership than
would have been the case if it had stayed out. This helps Malta to be more
effective in dealing with the external environment and in mitigating exoge-
nous shocks emanating from the region.
The voting power of micro–states in the EU is small but still dispropor-
tional to their population size following the principle of degressive propor-
tionality. In the Council, the micro–state faces three types of votes: a simple
majority, which is used for procedural decisions; qualified majority (QMV),
employed in many decisions concerning the internal market, economic affairs
and trade; and unanimity which is employed in foreign policy, defence, judi-
cial and police cooperation, and taxation. The small state exercises most
influence when matters are decided unanimously. In QMV the threshold is
set at 232 votes out of 321 (72.27 per cent) with Malta having three votes.
A decision taken by QMV also requires a favourable vote from the majority
of member states and a member state may also request verification that the
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qualified majority includes at least 62 per cent of the Union’s total popula-
tion. Should this not be the case, the decision will not be adopted. In CFSP
matters, every state has the right to constructive abstention.
However, participation in EU processes involves availability and use of
resources, which is a problem for micro–states. This is no more clearly
demonstrated than in the extensive committee systems that are associated
with EU law–making. The system traverses three main levels: at the
Commission level, when laws are drafted, much work is carried out by advi-
sory and scientific committees and expert groups, of which there are around
700; the proposal then moves to the adoption phase in Council, where
around 250 working groups of governmental representatives play a key
role; and lastly, at the implementation phase, numerous ‘comitology’
committees assist the Commission in implementing EU legislation. These are
chaired by a representative of the Commission and include representatives
of the member states. The EU’s committee structure thus confronts the
micro–state with the daunting task of maintaining contact with an vast
array of committees, estimated to number in the region of 1,500 (Gueguen
& Rosberg 2004).
Indeed, when an EU legislative proposal which is salient to its interests can
be followed from the early stages, the small state can better influence it
by taking action at a lower, less formal level before the proposal reaches
Council. The vast array of working groups involved may mean, however,
that the small state’s resources may be insufficient to cope. In addition there
is a ‘learning curve’ which has to be traversed before the small state attains
the optimal level of performance. Malta’s Permanent Representative in
Brussels claims that one year on, Malta has not yet reached the optimum
level of activity required to keep up with the demands of the working groups.
He passed a similar judgement on the national structures established to deal
with ‘pipeline acquis’, including the Standing Committee on Foreign and
European Affairs in Malta’s House of Representatives, which he claims need
to act faster on EU draft legislation (The Times of Malta, 30.04.2005).
Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, in 2004 the Foreign Affairs
Committee met twenty times, as compared to an average 6.7 meetings per
year for the period 1995–2003. It is thus clear that, unless a micro–state can
increase its efficiency, its ability to use the institutional opportunities open to
it to strengthen its resilience may be impaired.
Also important in enhancing national resilience are Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs), since they have many opportunities to
promote and defend national goals in the EP’s committees, where EU policies
and legislation are considered. In an attempt to improve the effectiveness of
Malta’s input, the Maltese MEPs participate in the work of the House of
Representative’s Standing Committee on Foreign and European Affairs. But
since the MEPs come from different political groupings, and given the strong
confrontational nature of Maltese politics, it is very difficult to link all five
of them in a common effort within the EP.
A micro–state’s performance in the EU institutions thus cannot be fully
appraised by relying on a ‘static’ analysis based on its position within the
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institutions as indicated in the treaties. Attention needs to be paid to the
manner in which micro–states navigate within the working groups and
committees, the manner in which they manage their human resources, the
quality of communications between the country’s representatives within
the EU institutions and the national government (both ministries and the
Permanent Representative in Brussels), and the quality of leadership involved
as well as political cohesion. Political convergence on EU matters at national
level helps the micro–state better deploy its limited resources in the Union in
pursuance of national goals. By working effectively from inside the EU insti-
tutions, a micro–state is better placed to successfully carry out policies which
help it overcome its vulnerabilities and strengthen its resilience.
EU Membership and Strengthening Resilience
The prospect of EU membership had polarised an already politically
confrontational Maltese society (Cini 2002; Pace 2002). Amongst the conse-
quences of this were a negative effect on the investment climate and
economic growth — for example, four of Malta’s leading businessmen, inter-
viewed in December 2002, claimed that uncertainty over the membership
issue was retarding investment decisions (The Malta Financial and Business
Times, 04.12.2002). Hence it is clear that political convergence on EU
membership can be considered as a resilience–building step because it
encourages confidence among economic decision–makers and encourages a
common national effort in facing to EU challenges.
Maltese membership has promoted political convergence, which is most
notably evident in the new, more pragmatic approach gradually adopted by
the Malta Labour Party (MLP), which had long opposed EU accession (Cini
2003; Pace 2004). This has reflected a general trend towards national
convergence on EU membership among political elites. Public opinion,
however, has not completely followed the politicians’ lead, as a Sunday
Times of Malta opinion poll, held one year after membership, indicated only
65 per cent of Maltese spontaneously recognised something positive resulting
from membership and only 52.7 per cent thought it was the best long–term
option for Malta (The Sunday Times of Malta 01.05.2005).
One reason why the public may still be hesitant on membership is that the
economic difficulties which result from the implementation of the long–
delayed economic restructuring process are often conflated with the effects
of EU membership. Economic restructuring is being carried out in line with
the Convergence Programme 2004–2007, published by the government
in May 2004, in conformity with the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. On
29 April 2005, Malta took the first step towards joining the single currency
when it joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II, citing among the
advantages the fact that 70 per cent of Malta’s trade is with the EU while
54 per cent is with the eurozone countries (Department of Information
2005). The authorities also claim that the introduction of the euro increases
price transparency enhances Malta’s attractiveness to foreign direct invest-
ment and maintains price stability.
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In preparation for the introduction of the euro, Malta has to achieve a
number of macroeconomic targets, which should enhance its resilience. In
2003, the government deficit stood at 9.7 per cent of GDP and the national
debt stood at 72 per cent of GDP. But government spending was drastically
reduced in 2004 and continues to decline. The fiscal deficit is to be reduced
to 3 per cent of GDP by 2006 and public debt is planned to be 70 per cent of
GDP by the end of 2007 (Malta Government 2004). Cost–cutting exercises
are being implemented across state–owned enterprises, among them the
national airline, AirMalta, the Public Broadcasting Corporation and Gozo
Channel, which operates the maritime link between the island of Gozo and
Malta. Parallel to this, other corporations owned by the state are being
restructured and/or privatised. Pension systems, social welfare, the health
and educational sectors, the management of the sea ports and public trans-
port are also being reformed in order to strengthen them financially. By
strengthening public finances and reducing public debt Malta is not only
complying with the requirements of European Monetary Union but it is also
strengthening its resilience to external shocks.
A similar argument can be applied to the policies pursued within the envi-
ronmental sector, particularly in the crucial area of urban waste recycling
(WasteServ Report 2004). The environmental regulatory framework has
been reinforced since Malta joined the EU and this is also important in the
context of resilience–building since it serves the purpose of sustainable devel-
opment, enhances welfare and positively affects the tourist sector, which
accounts for around a fifth of GDP.
The application of the acquis has also led to the establishment of indepen-
dent regulatory authorities to ensure the implementation of EU laws in such
vital sectors as telecommunications, product standards, the environment,
transport and competition. In the initial phase, these authorities suffered
from a lack of capacity to achieve their aims and presented new challenges
to the ability of Maltese political institutions to construct and oversee them
effectively. However, their development under EU requirements is strength-
ening good governance.
In addition to the activities of politicians and public officials, a rising
Maltese activism on the part of focused sectoral interests and associations of
civil society is also helping to improve governance and hence Malta’s resil-
ience. Many Maltese NGOs have developed links, both in the run–up to
membership and after, with their European counterparts: trade unions, for
example, are part of the European Trade Union Congress (ETUC) while
business organisations, such as the Malta Federation of Industries and the
Malta Chamber of Commerce, are members of their respective European
organisations and have also established a Business Bureau in Brussels.
NGOs have, furthermore, become increasingly aware of the fact that to
achieve their aims they do not necessarily need to lobby compatriots in the
institutions: in March 2005, for instance, following a report by the UK
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds on hunting in Malta, Maltese
conservationists lobbied Robert Evans, a UK Socialist MEP, who then raised
the issue in the EP.
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Maltese NGOs are thus being ‘Europeanised’. Another example of how
the Maltese political system as a whole is being Europeanised is at the level
of local government, where local councils are increasingly communicating
directly with ‘Brussels’ on issues that are of concern to them. For instance, a
local council attempted to persuade the Commission to freeze EU funds for
a waste recycling plant because the council disagrees with its location.
The media are also contributing to Europeanisation by feeding the
European dimension into the domestic political domain. In so doing, the
media are contributing to a raising of public awareness of the role and signif-
icance of the EU, which can help to boost good governance and, in turn, to
strengthen resilience.
Conclusion — Resilience Building
This article has centred on small states’, and more especially micro–states’,
vulnerability and resilience. It has been shown that micro–states have inher-
ent and contingent vulnerabilities but that they can address these by follow-
ing policies aimed at building their resilience and by positioning themselves
strategically in the international global system.
Virtually all European micro–states have either joined the EU or are linked
to it by the strong integrative relationship of the EEA. Whilst EU membership
does not completely satisfy the security concerns of micro–state — using
security in its broader meaning — they do provide a valuable response to the
most salient concerns.
EU membership has led Malta to tackle its macro–economic fundamen-
tals, restructure its economy, strengthen internal competition through
liberalisation, increase efficiency through privatisation, protect its citizens by
tightening environmental regulation and management, and open new
avenues to its exporters of goods and services, both within the EU and
beyond, thus giving incentive to diversification. All these developments show
that EU membership can be efficiently used by a micro–state to address its
vulnerabilities — inherent and contingent — and thus to strengthen its
resilience.
In the EU institutions, the principle of degressive proportionality increases
a micro–state’s visibility even if its overall status remains one of weakness —
although not helplessness. The EU–Malta negotiations show that a small
state’s limited ability to fend for itself can be countered by an efficient use of
its resources and by striking alliances with information–rich supranational
institutions — most obviously the Commission — and with larger member
states.
Within the EU, it is important for small states, notwithstanding their
resource limitations, to pursue their interests at all levels, especially in the
policy spheres that are most salient to them. They need to participate in
the decision–making process from the very bottom and not to over–focus
on the top of the decisional pyramid. It is relatively easier to influence
decisions at the lower levels — at the planning and drafting stage and in
Council working groups — than at the very top.
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The EU offers micro–states opportunities and openings, most of which are
not available in a non–membership context, but it is up to the states them-
selves to make efficient use of them.
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Appendix 1. Summary of key points ‘conceded’ to Malta during the 
accession negotiations
■ Protocol 6: restricting the acquisition of secondary residencies in Malta by
non–Maltese nationals
■ Protocol 7: prohibiting the introduction of abortion unless the Maltese
consent to it by changing the law
■ Declaration No 14: allowing Malta a safeguard on the free movement of
workers
■ Declaration No 35: on neutrality
■ Declaration No 36: on the island region of Gozo
■ Declaration No 37: on the maintenance of zero VAT on food and phar-
maceuticals
■ Agriculture: the whole of Malta and Gozo declared least favoured area
and special aid programme permitted for the sector
■ Protection of the 25–mile fishing zone (OJ L236 12.09.2003, page 794)
■ Structural Funding: Malta and Gozo designated as Objective One region
■ Shipbuilding and ship repair: Malta given until 2008 to phase out state
support
■ Maltese accepted as an official language of the EU
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